(2020) How to Build Optimally Secure PRFs Using Block Ciphers.
|
Text
2020-1097.pdf Download (570kB) | Preview |
Abstract
In EUROCRYPT '96, Aiello and Venkatesan proposed two candidates for $ 2n $-bit to $ 2n $-bit pseudorandom functions (PRFs), called Benes and modified Benes (or mBenes), based on $ n $-bit to $ n $-bit PRFs. While Benes is known to be secure up to $ 2^n $ queries (Patarin, AFRICACRYPT '08), the security of mBenes has only been proved up to $ 2^{n(1-\epsilon)} $ queries for all $ \epsilon > 0 $ by Patarin and Montreuil in ICISC '05. In this work, we show that the composition of a $ 2n $-bit hash function with mBenes is a secure variable input length (VIL) PRF up to $ 2^{n-2} $ queries (given appropriate hash function bounds). We extend our analysis with block ciphers as the underlying primitive and obtain two optimally secure VIL PRFs using block ciphers. The first of these candidates requires $ 6 $ calls to the block cipher. The second candidate requires just $ 4 $ calls to the block cipher, but here the proof is based on Patarin's mirror theory. Further, we instantiate the hash function with a PMAC+/LightMAC+ like hash, to get six candidates for deterministic message authentication codes with optimal security.
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (A Paper) (Paper) |
|---|---|
| Divisions: | Benoît-Michel Cogliati (BC) |
| Conference: | ASIACRYPT International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security |
| Depositing User: | Benoît-Michel Cogliati |
| Date Deposited: | 08 Oct 2020 18:33 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Dec 2021 11:13 |
| Primary Research Area: | NRA1: Trustworthy Information Processing |
| URI: | https://publications.cispa.saarland/id/eprint/3190 |
Actions
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |