(2020) Exorcising Spectres with Secure Compilers.
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Abstract
Attackers can access sensitive information of programs by exploiting the side-effects of speculatively-executed instructions using Spectre attacks. To mitigate theses attacks, popular compilers deployed a wide range of countermeasures. The security of these countermeasures, however, has not been ascertained: while some of them are believed to be secure, others are known to be insecure and result in vulnerable programs. To reason about the security guarantees of these compiler-inserted countermeasures, this paper presents a framework comprising several secure compilation criteria characterizing when compilers produce code resistant against Spectre attacks. With this framework, we perform a comprehensive security analysis of compiler-level countermeasures against Spectre attacks implemented in major compilers. This work provides sound foundations to formally reason about the security of compiler-level countermeasures against Spectre attacks as well as the first proofs of security and insecurity of said countermeasures.
| Item Type: | Other |
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| Depositing User: | Marco Patrignani |
| Date Deposited: | 14 Dec 2020 10:02 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Dec 2020 10:02 |
| Primary Research Area: | NRA1: Trustworthy Information Processing |
| URI: | https://publications.cispa.saarland/id/eprint/3327 |
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