Kizzle: A Signature Compiler for Detecting Exploit Kits

Stock, Ben and Livshits, Benjamin and Zorn, Benjamin
(2016) Kizzle: A Signature Compiler for Detecting Exploit Kits.
In: The 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks.
Conference: DSN IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks

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In recent years, the drive-by malware space has undergone significant consolidation. Today, the most common source of drive-by downloads are socalled exploit kits (EKs). This paper presents Kizzle, the first prevention technique specifically designed for finding exploit kits. Our analysis shows that while the JavaScript delivered by kits varies greatly, the unpacked code varies much less, due to the kits authors’ code reuse between versions. Ironically, this well-regarded software engineering practice allows us to build a scalable and precise detector that is able to quickly respond to superficial but frequent changes in EKs. Kizzle is able to generate anti-virus signatures for detecting EKs, which compare favorably to manually created ones. Kizzle is highly responsive and can generate new signatures within hours. Our experiments show that Kizzle produces high-accuracy signatures. When evaluated over a four-week period, false-positive rates for Kizzle are under 0.03%, while the false-negative rates are under 5%.


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