(2019) Poster: TGX: Secure SGX enclave management using TPM.
|
Text
ndss2019posters_paper_25.pdf Download (468kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Intel SGX provides a trusted execution environment on commodity computing platforms. Recent micro-architectural attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, or Foreshadow, however, raise doubts about the promised isolation of SGX-protected code and data, including some of the necessary cryptographic operations and credentials, e.g., for attestation. In this poster we present TGX, a combination of SGX and TPM working together to provide stronger isolation of crucial cryptographic operations of SGX and a way to circumvent microarchitectural attacks against SGX. TGX enables SGX to move its signing and verification mechanism from processor to TPM making the security sensitive information never available outside TPM, removing, for instance, the possibilities of stealing them from L1 cache. In particular, TGX should motivate that SGX and TPM can form a beneficial symbiosis.
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (A Paper) (Poster) |
|---|---|
| Divisions: | Sven Bugiel (Trusted Systems Group, TSG) |
| Conference: | NDSS Network and Distributed System Security Symposium |
| Depositing User: | Dhiman Chakraborty |
| Date Deposited: | 23 May 2019 18:00 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Oct 2022 20:05 |
| Primary Research Area: | NRA4: Secure Mobile and Autonomous Systems |
| URI: | https://publications.cispa.saarland/id/eprint/2886 |
Actions
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |