(2019) Quantifying the Information Leakage in Cache Attacks via Symbolic Execution.
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Abstract
Cache attacks allow attackers to infer the properties of a secret execution by observing cache hits and misses. But how much information can actually leak through such attacks? For a given program, a cache model, and an input, our CHALICE framework leverages symbolic execution to compute the amount of information that can possibly leak through cache attacks. At the core of CHALICE is a novel approach to quantify information leakage that can highlight critical cache side-channel leakage on arbitrary binary code. In our evaluation on real-world programs from OpenSSL and Linux GDK libraries, CHALICE effectively quantifies information leakage: For an AES-128 implementation on Linux, for instance, CHALICE finds that a cache attack can leak as much as 127 out of 128 bits of the encryption key.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Uncontrolled Keywords: | cache, security, symbolic execution, Side channel |
| Divisions: | Andreas Zeller (Software Engineering, ST) |
| Depositing User: | Andreas Zeller |
| Date Deposited: | 26 May 2020 08:52 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Jun 2020 10:03 |
| Primary Research Area: | NRA3: Threat Detection and Defenses |
| URI: | https://publications.cispa.saarland/id/eprint/3066 |
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